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Abstract
Governments in resource abundant economies face a tradeo¤ between transferring wealth
to present generations and saving for future generations. Employing an overlapping genera-
tions framework with endogenous growth, this paper analyzes the intergenerational welfare
e¤ects of: (1) a wealth transfer policy where the entire wealth is transferred to the gen-
erations alive at present; (2) an income transfer policy where the wealth is saved and the
permanent income of the wealth is transferred to all present and future generations, forever.
Not surprisingly, present generations are unambiguously better o¤ with the wealth transfer
policy. Less trivially, however, the wealth transfer policy can be associated with higher wel-
fare also for future generations. The intuition for this result is that while a wealth transfer
depresses growth only in the periods subsequent to the transfer, income transfers constitute
a permanent drag on growth. Perhaps counter to the naïve intuition, the policy of saving
the wealth and distributing the permanent income to all present and future generations is
less benecial for the future generations if the real return to saving is high.
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1 Introduction
The possible adverse economic e¤ects of resource windfalls have gained increasing attention since
the empirical contributions of Sachs and Warner (1995, 1997, 2001). Within a large sample of
countries, Sachs and Warner document a negative correlation between various measures of re-
source abundance and growth between 1970 and 1989. Gylfason et al. (1999) provide support for
these ndings, as do several case studies such as Gelb (1988), Karl (1997) and Auty (2001). One
hypothesis for the resource curse is Dutch disease, where the foreign exchange gift indirectly
crowds out some productivity enhancing activity.1 The productivity enhancing activity is usu-
ally identied as traded sector production, or manufacturing, and the productivity generating
mechanism is some form of learning by doing. The theoretical contributions of Van Wijnbergen
(1984), Krugman (1987), Matsuyama (1992), Sachs and Warner (1995) and Torvik (2001) all
analyze how resource windfalls may lower growth by crowding out traded sector production.2
The potential negative e¤ects of natural resource wealth on growth due to Dutch disease raise
a question that has largely been ignored in the existing literature: What are the consequences
for the intergenerational distribution of welfare of di¤erent transfer paths of a natural resource
wealth? This question calls for a positive answer, but has strong normative implications, and
the question is at the heart of the policy debates in most natural resource abundant countries.3
In order to analyze intergenerational welfare, models of overlapping generations are required.4
Several contributions address di¤erent welfare aspects of the intertemporal and/or the intergen-
erational allocation of natural resources.5 However, none account for the Dutch disease dynamic
and the intergenerational distribution of welfare simultaneously. Perhaps most closely related to
the present analysis is Sachs and Warner (1995), who analyze the Dutch disease within an over-
lapping generations framework but disregard the intertemporal government budget constraint
and transitional dynamics.
Combining the models of Persson (1985) and Sachs andWarner (1995), this paper analyzes the
intergenerational welfare e¤ects of resource wealth when there is learning-by-doing (LBD) in the
traded sector, explicitly taking into account the intertemporal government budget constraint.6
1Two main competitors to the Dutch disease hypothesis are the rent-seeking hypothesis (see, e.g., Lane and
Tornell, 1996; Torvik, 2002; Mehlum et al., 2005) and the political economy approach (see, e.g., Ross, 1999, 2001;
Robinson et al., 2002; Aslaksen et al., 2006; Andersen and Aslaksen, 2008). The rent-seeking hypothesis analyze
how productive activities can be crowded out by rent-seeking activities, while the political economy approach
focuses on how larger political rents a¤ect the incentives of political players and the outcomes of political processes.
2Neary and van Wijnbergen (1986) provide an early overview of the theoretical and empirical literature on the
Dutch disease.
3The normative implications of exhaustible resource abundance is in fact at the heart of a body of literature
initiated by Solow (1974), which has been briey reviewed by Asheim (2005). This literature employs utilitarian
Ramsey-type models, like the so-called Dasgupta-Heal-Solow model (as in Dasgupta and Heal, 1979), and works
out rules for ethical transfer paths, as in, for example, Hartwick (1977, 1978a, 1978b).
4As suggested by, e.g., Solow (1986).
5See, e.g., Mansoorian (1991), Gerlagh and Keyzer (2001), Gerlagh and Van der Zwaan (2002), Agnani et al.
(2005), and, in a development context, van der Ploeg and Venables (2009).
6Persson (1985) employs a Diamond (1965) OLG model and shows how public debt in small open economies
results in a redistribution of welfare from future to present generations. In contrast to the Dutch disease literature,
however, the only source of growth in this model is exogenous population growth.
There are generally two ways resource wealth may a¤ect intergenerational welfare allocation. The
direct way is through the level e¤ect of transfers: a transfer of wealth to the private sector today
has a direct negative impact on the amount of wealth available for transfers in the future. The
indirect way is through endogenous growth e¤ects: high aggregate demand caused by government
transfers a¤ects the sectoral composition of the economy, which in turn a¤ects the productivity
growth. The transfer path of resource wealth thus has two potentially conicting e¤ects on the
intergenerational allocation of welfare.
The intergenerational welfare e¤ects of di¤erent transfer paths clearly have policy implica-
tions. In the current analysis, two distinct policy options are characterized and their intergen-
erational welfare e¤ects are compared. The rst policy option is a wealth transfer policy. A
wealth transfer policy implies transferring the ownership of the resource wealth to the public,
i.e., to the generations alive at the time of the windfall. The second policy option is an income
transfer policy, where the government transfers the permanent income of the resource wealth
to all current and future generations. Both policy options are relevant, as they are frequently
mentioned both in the literature and in the public resource management debate.7
Clearly, a wealth transfer policy is associated with higher welfare for the rst period gener-
ations (in the short run), compared with the income transfer policy. Moreover, because of its
strong adverse e¤ects on traded sector employment, the wealth transfer policy is more damaging
for growth in the subsequent period(s). Thus, the wealth transfer policy is associated with wel-
fare reduction for the generations alive in the medium run, compared with the income transfer
policy. However, when comparing with the income transfer policy, the wealth transfer policy
may improve welfare in terms of higher GDP and income for future generations. The reason
for this somewhat counterintuitive result is that while the income transfer policy has less severe
consequences for growth in the short run, its innite transfer path constitutes a permanent drag
on growth. Using numerical simulations it is shown that the wealth transfer policy can be asso-
ciated with a higher welfare for the future generations compared with the income transfer policy
for a range of realistic parameter values to characterize the economy.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 denes the static
and dynamic equilibria. Section 4 provides the results and a discussion on the growth and the
intergenerational welfare e¤ects of the two policy alternatives, and Section 5 concludes.
2 Model
2.1 The supply side
Consider a small open economy of two sectors producing traded (T ) and nontraded (N) goods.
The labor force is allocated between these two sectors, and  is the fraction of the labor force
7The wealth transfer policy is similar to, e.g., the proposition in Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003) re-
garding the management of Nigerias natural resource wealth. The income transfer policy is similar to, e.g., the
spending rule of the Norwegian Government (see, e.g., Hanneson (2001, ch.7).
employed in traded sector production, 0    1. All endogenous dynamics arise from accumula-
tion of human capital through a LBD mechanism; productivity is assumed to grow proportional
to traded sector employment. Following Sachs and Warner (1995) technological progress spills
entirely over to the nontraded sector, ensuring balanced growth. The endogenous dynamics of
productivity, H, can then be written
Ht+1  Ht
Ht
= t. (1)
Thus, productivity growth from period t to t+1 is equal to the traded sector employment i period
t multiplied by a growth factor , and is a positive externality of traded sector production8 . As
in Romer (1986), each rm is too small to take the LBD externality into account.
Production in both sectors is proportional to both labor and technology,
XTt = Htt (2)
XNt = Ht (1  t) . (3)
The supply side of the model is thus similar to Sachs and Warner (1995), except that the
expressions are simplied by leaving out real capital in the production functions. Not explicitly
modelling the real capital dynamics makes the dynamic derivations simpler without losing any
important insight. Assuming internationally perfectly mobile capital at a constant (marginal)
price, capital adjusts so that the capital-labor ratio is constant, and the result is constant returns-
to-scale production with respect to all factors (as in Sachs and Warner, 1995). Since production
in both sectors is characterized by constant returns to scale, the relative prices are constant
and the real exchange rate is uniquely determined by the supply side. For simplicity all prices,
including the real exchange rate, are normalized to unity.9 Total production in the economy at
time t is the sum of traded sector production, (2), and nontraded sector productions, (3),
Xt = XTt +XNt = Ht. (4)
2.2 The demand side
As in Diamond (1965), individuals live for two periods, and a new generation is born at the
beginning of each period. In each time period there is one representative individual for each
generation, the young (y) and the old (o). Utility of the representative individual born at the
8Assuming that the productivity growth rate is proportional to traded sector employment is a nonessential
simplication of the hypothesis that productivity growth is a positive byproduct of employment, known as the
learning by doing e¤ect. Any increasing function of labor input would produce qualitatively similar results.
9Note that a single time period in this model is typically 25-30 years. Assuming balanced growth within each
time period implies that the real exchange rate remains constant within each time period. Hence, the model does
not address short term real exchange rate uctuations.
beginning of period t is time separable with CobbDouglas utility within each period, and writes
U
 
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y
Nt; C
o
Tt+1; C
o
Nt+1

= ln
h
(CyTt)

(CyNt)
1 i
+  ln
h 
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  
CoNt+1
1 i
. (5)
In equation (5),  is the weight on traded sector goods, 0 <  < 1, and  is the individual time
preference discount factor.
The individuals work only in the period when they are young, but in addition to labor income
the individuals also receive a ow of government transfers, Rt. Although productivity and hence
production income is endogenous in the dynamic model, it is considered exogenous by each single
consumer the individuals do not take into account their own contribution to growth, nor do
they inuence the amount of government transfers. However, all individuals are forward looking
in the sense that they have knowledge of the total value of all the transfers they will receive
during their lifetimes. The budget constraint every individual faces is thus
CyTt + C
y
Nt +
CoTt+1 + C
o
Nt+1
1 + r
= Xt +
Rt
2
+
Rt+1
2 (1 + r)
. (6)
The left-hand side of the budget constraint is the present value of lifetime consumption, while
the right-hand side is the present value of lifetime disposable income. The government transfers
in each period, Rt and Rt+1, are assumed to be distributed equally between the two living
generations. The world real rate of interest, r, is exogenous to the small economy and constant
over time.
Due to CobbDouglas utility, a constant fraction of total consumption expenditure is spent
on each good within each time period. The fraction of consumption of nontradable goods in
each period is equal to 1  , and hence the fraction of tradable goods is given by . Further, a
homothetic intertemporal utility function in a constant interest rate environment implies that a
constant fraction 1  s of lifetime wealth is spent on rst period consumption, and, conversely, a
fraction s is saved for second period consumption.10 Maximization of the utility (5) with respect
to the budget constraint (6) results in the following static demand functions:
CyTt = 
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Rt
2
+
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2 (1 + r)

(7)
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2
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2
+
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2 (1 + r)
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(10)
10The intertemporal Euler equation is Cot+1 = (1 + r)C
y
t , and the savings rate is given by s =

1+
:
The demand functions (7) to (10) of the representative individual are characterized by constant
budget shares of total discounted lifetime income which, in turn, are functions of the static
preference structure, the world real rate of interest, and the discount rate.
2.3 The government and alternative policies
The government receives a windfall or, alternatively, discovers a natural resource wealth of
the real value W1, at the beginning of period 1. The sole mandate of the government is to
distribute this wealth to current and future generations under the restriction that any transfer
policy must satisfy the intertemporal budget constraint
(1 + r)W1 =
1X
t=1

1
1 + r
t 1
Rt: (11)
In (11) the term (1 + r)W1 represents the rst period value of the foreign exchange gift, while
the right-hand side of the expression is the present value of current and future transfers from the
government to the individuals.
Two types of policies that have been proposed in the literature will be discussed and compared
below. The rst is an income transfer policy similar to the spending rule of the Norwegian
Petroleum Fund, as in, e.g., van der Ploeg and Venables (2009).11 Such a spending rule implies
that the government transfers the permanent income from foreign exchange wealth, RIt, to the
public in each period, where
RIt = rW1;8t: (12)
Assuming the transfers are split equally between the two generations, each generation will receive
a transfer of rW12 in every period.
12
The second policy alternative that will be discussed is a wealth transfer policy, that is to let
individuals the public manage the windfall, in line with the proposal of, e.g., Sala-i-Martin
and Subramanian (2003). A wealth transfer policy, thus, implies that the entire resource wealth
is transferred to the generations alive in the rst period, and the individuals decide for themselves
how much to spend and how much to save. The amount of the transfers in any period, RW , is
consequently
RW1 = (1 + r)W1 (13)
RWt = 0; t 2 [2;!) ;
of which each generation alive in period 1 is assumed to receive a transfer of (1+r)W12 . The
11The Norwegian spending rule says that 4 % of accumulated nancial assets may be spent every year. See
Hanneson (2001, ch. 7) and Røed Larsen (2003) for more on the spending rule.
12The exact allocation of resources between the two generations alive in each time period t is not important for
the mechanisms considered, as long as each generation receives a positive fraction of the transfer which is constant
over time. The equal split is chosen both because of its appeal due to fairness considerations, and to make the
model as simple as possible.
transfers in all future periods equal zero.
3 Mechanisms and static derivations
3.1 Labor market resource allocation static equilibrium
The total demand for nontradable goods in period t, CNt, is the sum of demand from the younger
(equation (8)) and the older (equation (10)) generations,
CNt = C
y
Nt + C
o
Nt
=
1  
1 + 
[Ht + (1 + r)Ht 1]
+
1  
1 + 

1
1 + r
Rt+1
2
+ (1 + )
Rt
2
+ (1 + r)
Rt 1
2

: (14)
In equation (14) production income, X, in period t and t   1 is substituted by the level of
productivity, H, in the same two periods using equation (4).
Demand is clearly boosted by the government transfers, R. Equation (14) states that demand
for nontradable goods in time t depends on discounted total lifetime income of the young and
savings of the old, which in turn depends on discounted total lifetime income of the old in time
t  1. Thus, the government transfers a¤ect consumption demand both contemporaneously, and
with a one period lag and a one period lead. In addition, consumption demand will depend on
the endogenous dynamics of the productivity Ht.
From equations (3) and (14), static equilibrium in the market for nontradable goods implies
that
t =
1
1 + 

 +     (1  ) (1 + r) Ht 1
Ht

 1  
1 + 

1
(1 + r)
Rt+1
2
+ (1 + )
Rt
2
+ (1 + r)
Rt 1
2

1
Ht
. (15)
Equation (15) states that the traded sector employment and thus growth is a function of both
productivity and production income for both living generations and of the transfer policy.
There are several things to note from this equilibrium condition. First, in the absence of
government transfers the last term in equation (15) disappears. Traded sector employment and
growth is then only determined by the endogenous dynamics, represented by the term Ht 1Ht .
When the older generation in period t is relatively poor (i.e., relatively low Ht 1Ht ), consumption
demand is relatively low in proportion to domestic supply, Ht ( Xt). Relatively low aggregate
domestic demand implies less crowding out of traded sector production and hence more learning
by doing and higher growth. In contrast, if the older generation is relatively wealthy, there will
be a stronger crowding out of traded sector production and lower growth.13 The ratio Ht 1Ht
13Note that the Engel elasticities of demand for each generation equals one. Higher income means higher
generally determined by some initial values of productivity, the parameters of the model, and
historical government transfer policy. The dynamics are analyzed in more depth later.
Second, note the standard static Dutch disease result; positive government transfers (expan-
sionary scal policy), Rt > 0, has a negative impact on traded sector employment. This is
a standard crowding out e¤ect; expansionary scal policy increases private disposable income,
which in turn drives up demand for all (normal) goods, leading to a crowding out of traded sector
production. As with aggregate demand it is not just the transfers today that directly inuence
the labor allocation. Forward-looking individuals who were young yesterday (t  1) and received
a government transfer when young will save a xed proportion of this wealth for consumption
when old (t). In addition, those who are young today will, being aware that they are going to
receive a transfer tomorrow (t + 1), choose to consume some proportion of this income today.
Consequently, government transfers a¤ect employment contemporaneously, as well as with a one
period lead and a one period lag.
Since t 2 (0; 1), equation (15) implies the following restrictions on the relationship between
transfers and GDP and growth,14
1
2

1
1 + r
Rt+1 + (1 + )Rt + (1 + r)Rt 1

< Ht

 + 
1      (1 + r)
Ht 1
Ht

: (16)
Equation (16) states that for any level of growth the economy can absorb larger transfers when
GDP, Ht, is larger. In addition the restriction implies that for any given GDP level, higher
growth allows for larger transfers. Finally, the timing of the transfers matter not just directly,
as can be easily seen from equation (16), but also indirectly through the endogenous growth
dynamics.
consumption demand for both goods. The fact that higher demand for nontradable goods is crowding out
tradable domestic production implies that the elasticity of imports with respect to aggregate income is greater
than one. Since the individuals who are young contribute their own supply as their labor income stems from their
own contributions to production (in line with Says law), it is the proportion of the income of the old relative to
that of the young that matters for the allocation of employment between the two sectors.
14The restrictions implicitly impose constraints on the parameter values, given that Rt > 0. These matters are
more formally addressed in the Appendix. Note that an alternative approach than imposing restrictons on the
parameter values, or alternatively on Rt, would be to allow for a corner solution for the traded sector employment
(ensuring that extreme boosts to aggregate demand do not result in negative levels of traded sector production).
3.2 Productivity dynamics and dynamic equilibrium
Equations (1) and (15), given the restrictions dened in equation (16), dene the productivity
growth path,15
Ht  

1 +  +  ( + )
1 + 

Ht 1 +

 (1  ) (1 + r)
1 + 

Ht 2
=   (1  )

Rt
2 (1 + r) (1 + )
+
Rt 1
2
+
(1 + r)Rt 2
2 (1 + )

: (17)
From equation (17) it is clear that the model possesses dynamic endogenous growth properties,
also in the absence of foreign exchange transfers. In a growing economy the development of
productivity, GDP and income will be converging towards a steady state growth rate dened
by16
 =
  [1 +     ( + )]
2 (1 + )
+
q
[1 +     ( + )]2 + 4 (1 + ) [ +     (1  ) (1 + r)]
2 (1 + )
. (18)
As equation (18) shows, government transfers do not a¤ect the steady state growth rate. The
reason is that in a growing economy the ratio of the transfers to GDP approaches zero as time
approaches innity. Steady state growth and labor allocation are therefore only determined by
the deep parameters of the economy; the individual time preference factor, , the strength of
the learning-by-doing mechanism, , the preferences for tradables (vs. nontradables), , and the
world rate of interest, r.
4 Transfer policies: growth and welfare
4.1 Benchmark: No (net) government transfers
As a benchmark, consider rst the growth path and welfare distribution of an economy in which
there are no (net) government transfers, Rt = 0; all t. Assuming that the economy is in its steady
state, productivity, production and welfare for each generation grow at a the same constant rate,
, where  is dened by equation (18). The reason why this special case may serve as a useful
15 In the analyses that follow it is assumed that the Period 1 government transfers are unexpected (a windfall
is, per se, unexpected). This implies that Period 1 productivity is predetermined, and is dened by H1 =h
1++(+)
1+
i
H0  
h
(1 )(1+r)
1+
i
H 1. Moreover, since the Period 1 transfer is unexpected for the generation
that is old in Period 1, forcing them to consume the entire transfer in this period, the solution for the Period 2
productivity deviates from the general dynamic solution. The Period 2 productivity is H2 =
h
1++(+)
1+
i
H1 h
(1 )(1+r)
1+
i
H0    1 1+
h
R2
2(1+r)
+
(2+ )R1
2
i
:
16Note that growth is, by equation (1), proportional to the employment share of the traded sector. See the
Appendix A1A4 for the derivation of  and for the general and specic solution to equation (17).
benchmark is that this is the overall productivity maximizing solution. Note, however, that with
positive net government transfers, productivity maximization is not equivalent either to income
or to welfare maximization.
4.2 An income transfer policy
Implementing an income transfer policy, as dened in eq. (12), will have e¤ects on both growth
and welfare distribution across generations, compared to the benchmark. The model identies
two separate e¤ects; one direct income e¤ect and one indirect, dynamic growth e¤ect. First, an
income transfer policy secures every generation the same positive level-shift in life-time income
equal to rW1(2+r)2(1+r) .
17 Second, there is a dynamic e¤ect through the mechanism of LBD and
endogenous productivity growth. This second indirect e¤ect is unambiguously negative with
respect to income for all future generations (see the right-hand side in eq. (17)).18
Inference regarding the net welfare e¤ects of an income transfer policy requires aggregation of
the direct and indirect income e¤ects. A comparison with the benchmark policy of no government
transfers provides three important corollaries.
First, both generations alive in the period of implementation (t = 1) experience an unambigu-
ous welfare gain compared with the benchmark of no transfers. Moreover, the generation young
in Period 1 is the overall winner as it receives government transfers throughout its lifetime.
The lifetime net gain of an income transfer policy for the generation young in Period 1 is equal
to the discounted value of the income transfer, rW1(2+r)2(1+r) .
Second, in the long run, t  ! 1, the indirect growth e¤ect will eventually outweigh the
level e¤ect of the government transfers. Although the growth rate eventually will converge to
its steady state rate, the productivity level will diverge from the benchmark level because of the
negative growth shifts during the relatively long period of transition.19 Thus, after some point
in time dependent on the characteristics of the economy individuals are worse o¤ with the
income transfers than they would have been with the benchmark of no transfers.
Third, from the rst and the second corollaries it is clear that there exists a turning point
in time, within the interval t 2 (1;1), where the net welfare e¤ect of an income transfer policy
relative to the benchmark goes from positive to negative. Around this turning point, the gross
lifetime gain of government transfers, rW1(2+r)2(1+r) , is neutralized by the gross loss in production due
to the negative dynamic e¤ects of the government transfers. Thus, compared to the benchmark
case, an income transfer policy is welfare improving for earlier generations and welfare deteri-
orating for future generations. The speed of transition depends on the parameter values and
17The only exception is the old generation in period 1, which only receives the transfer in this period.
18A priori, the generation young in Period 1 may su¤er from the adverse growth e¤ects by a wealth transfer
policy. However, processes of learning by doing are often quite slow, and the full implementation of new technology
(skills, techniques, etc.) is likely to happen with a lag. In the model, a demand shock in one period does not
a¤ect productivity until the next period.
19Given equation (16), the growth rate will be converging towards the steady state growth rate (not overshooting
it) after an initial shock. Thus, after a negative shock, the growth rate will gradually adjust from below towards
the steady state equilibrium. The adjustment will be faster in the rst periods than in the subsequent periods.
on the size of the foreign exchange wealth. It is straightforward to show that there are feasible
parameter combinations that reduce welfare as early as for the generation young in Period 2.20
4.3 A wealth transfer policy
A wealth transfer policy involves transferring the entire foreign exchange wealth, including in-
terests, R1 = (1 + r)W1, to the two generations alive in the rst policy period, t = 1. After
Period 1, there will be no more government transfers, hence Rt = 0;8 t 2 [2;1). The same two
distinct e¤ects as before may be identied; the positive direct income e¤ect and the negative
growth e¤ect.
The rst corollary of a wealth transfer policy is that the two generations alive in period 1,
t = 1, both evidently experience a net welfare gain, as they both receive a transfer of (1+r)W12
in period 1 without having any of their predetermined income reduced. The welfare gain is
potentially largest for the younger generation, since they are free to choose their own consumption
path. The older generation will consume the entire transfer in Period 1. Finally, note that both
generations alive in Period 1 are unambiguously better o¤ with a wealth transfer policy than
with any of the other two alternatives. For the older generation it is straightforward to conrm
that RW2 >
RI
2 > 0. For the young generation the di¤erence in transfers between privatization
and a permanent income rule equals W12(1+r) > 0.
The second corollary is that subsequent generations that is all generations born in t 2
[2;!) experience an unambiguous negative welfare e¤ect of the wealth transfer policy relative
to the benchmark case. These generations only inherit the negative indirect dynamic produc-
tivity e¤ects, and receive no government transfers to compensate for income loss due to lower
productivity. Although the growth rate will gradually converge towards the steady state level,
the transition period of lower growth will permanently shift the growth path downwards.
4.4 Income transfers versus a wealth transfer
In terms of welfare for future generations (i.e. for those born after the medium term which,
as demonstrated above, can end as early as the beginning of period 3), both the income trans-
fer policy and the wealth transfer policy are worse than the benchmark case with no transfers.
However, given that the national wealth will be consumed sooner or later, a more interesting
question is: what are the comparative welfare e¤ects of transferring the entire wealth to the
present generations, compared with transferring the permanent income to all generations for-
ever? As noted above, a wealth transfer policy unambiguously implies the highest welfare for
the generations alive in Period 1, compared to an income transfer policy. However, because
20Comparing the welfare of the generation young in Period 2 in the benchmark case with the in-
come transfer policy case shows that for certain parameter combinations, r > 2(1+) (1 )(3+ )
1+ (1 )(2+ ) if
[1 +     (1  ) (2 +    )] > 0 and r < 2(1+) (1 )(3+ )
1+ (1 )(2+ ) if [1 +     (1  ) (2 +    )] < 0, the
income transfer policy case is associated with lower welfare than the benchmark case as early as for the genera-
tion young in Period 2.
H2 (wealth transfer policy) < H2 (income transfer policy), the wealth transfer policy is more
damaging for the rst growth period.21 Hence, the generation born in period 2 the period
subsequent to the windfall period is unambiguously worse o¤ with the wealth transfer policy.
Going beyond period 2, which policy is more favorable for the welfare of future generations
generally depends on the specic characteristics (i.e., parameter values) of the economy. Em-
ploying the arbitrarily chosen but empirically plausible parameter values  = 1,  = 0:4 and
 = 0:3, and assuming an initial foreign exchange wealth of 5% of GDP, Chart 1 shows that
income, net of government transfers, is higher with a wealth transfer policy than with an income
transfer policy as early as for the generation young in Period 3. In this simulation the annual
world interest rate is set at 0:05, assuming a period length of 25 years. The long-run, steady
state traded sector share of GDP implied by this specic parameter constellation is 12:5%, which
appears a reasonable number for the average natural resource producing country.22 For later
generations, t 2 [4;!), the di¤erence in production income between a wealth transfer- and an
income transfer policy is increasingly diverging. The net welfare e¤ects lag behind the produc-
tivity e¤ect as these also depend on the income e¤ects of the wealth, and the turning point in
comparative welfare is somewhere between the generations that are young in the periods 4 and 5
(see Chart 2). Thus, given the economic characteristics dened by the parameter values above,
the generations that are young in periods 2, 3 and 4 are the only generations that are worse o¤
with respect to total income in a wealth transfer policy regime compared with an income transfer
policy regime.
4.5 Parameter sensitivity and the world real interest rate
As noted above, the relative performance of the two policy alternatives with respect to the
welfare of future generations generally depends on the economy specic characteristics.23 A key
parameter of the model is the world real interest rate, as this, for any given level of learning by
doing and any given preference structure, determines the real return to saving relative. Hence,
the world real interest rate determines the householdsintertemporal consumption paths as well
as the rate of return on private and public savings. Perhaps counterintuitively, then, a higher
world interest rate would not weaken, but strengthen our main result that a wealth transfer
policy is better for the welfare of future generations (in the baseline simulation, all generations
born at the beginning of Period 4 and later) than an income transfer policy. The intuition for this
result is that even if a positive shift in the world interest rate clearly has a positive level e¤ect for
the income transfers by raising the real value for future generations of the transfers they will
receive the negative, long run growth e¤ects from a larger crowding out of future traded sector
21The formal condition for this to hold is r >   2+ 
1+  . As the right-hand side of the inequality is negative,
this condition will always be fullled.
22Data from the World Bank WDI database (http://publications.worldbank.org/WDI/) indicate that the share
of manufacturing in Norway, the U.K, Brazil and Nigeria is 10% (2007), 14% (2004), 18% (2007), and 3% (2006),
respectively.
23See the Appendix, Section A5, for a detailed discussion of how the properties of the model depend on the
parameter values.
production dominates the positive level e¤ect. Performing a sensitivity analysis with regard to
the real rate of interest (holding the other parameter values constant) shows that this result is
indeed robust; only lower annual real interest rates than approximately 0:01 makes an income
transfer policy preferable for future generations. In this case, the two generations alive in Period
1 are the only ones to benet from a wealth transfer policy.
5 Concluding remarks
This paper extends the literature on the Dutch disease in two ways. First, the full dynamics
(transitional and steady state) of Dutch disease with learning by doing externalities in a simple
overlapping generations framework is characterized. Second, the explicit growth and welfare
e¤ects of two relevant policy options are analyzed and compared. The rst is a wealth transfer
policy, where the government transfers the entire sum of a natural resource wealth to the gen-
erations alive at the time of the windfall. The second is an income transfer policy, where the
government transfers the permanent-income of the wealth to the generations alive in each period
forever.
The results from the analysis suggest that the concern for the welfare of future generations
cannot consistently be used as an argument for saving rather than spending a resource wealth.
Depending on the characteristics of the economy, and given a su¢ ciently high world real interest
rate, transferring the entire resource wealth to current generations may increase the welfare of
future generations, compared with the income transfer policy.
Three caveats associated with the current analysis should, however, be noted. First, the
results critically rests on the (standard) assumption that the traded sector is a more important
driver of growth than the nontraded sector. Reversing this assumption would also reverse the
comparative results. Second, the analysis does not consider optimality.24 Third, the analysis
ignores the potential political-economic e¤ects of natural resource wealth and natural resource
management. Needless to say, there may certainly be weighty political economic arguments
against pursuing a wealth transfer policy, in particular in countries which are characterized by
weak or malfunctioning political- and democratic institutions. However, there is indeed also great
uncertainty attached to what may be the long-term political-economic consequences of the build
up of huge public savings funds. The analysis of the political economy of intergenerational conict
in the presence of vast natural resources is therefore an important topic for future research.
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Appendix
A1 The general solution of eq. (17)
Eq. (17),
Ht+2  

1 +  +  ( + )
1 + 

Ht+1 +

 (1  ) (1 + r)
1 + 

Ht = 0, (19)
is a linear second order inhomogeneous di¤erence equation in the constant coe¢ cients a and b,
where a = 1++(+)1+ and b =
(1 )(1+r)
1+ , b 6= 0, and with the particular solution of eq. (17),
ut . Substituting Ht = m
t in eq. (19) gives mt
 
m2 + am+ b

= 0. For m to t into eq. (19), m
must satisfy the characteristic equation
m2 + am+ b = 0. (20)
The roots of eq. (20) are
m1 =
1 +  +  ( + )
1 + 
+
s
1
4

1 +  +  ( + )
1 + 
2
   (1  ) (1 + r)
1 + 
, (21)
m2 =
1 +  +  ( + )
1 + 
 
s
1
4

1 +  +  ( + )
1 + 
2
   (1  ) (1 + r)
1 + 
. (22)
Consequently, the general solutions of eq. (19), where C1 and C2 are arbitrary constants, are:
6.0.1 If eq. (20) has a pair of real roots:
Ht = C1m
t
1 + C2m
t
2 (23)
6.0.2 If eq. (20) has a double real root:
Ht = (C1 + C2t)m
t
2 (24)
The case of complex roots does not make economic sense and is therefore ignored throughout
the analysis.
A2 Stability analysis 1
This section analyzes the stability of the general solutions above. In the present context, instabil-
ityis a situation where the levels of interest (production, productivity, wealth, and consequently
welfare) are ever-increasing, rather than converging towards some steady state levels. Eq. (19)
is globally and asymptotically stable if, and only if, jaj < 1 + b and b < 1. These conditions are
equivalent with the modili of each root in the characteristic equation being less than one. The
rst stability condition,
 <
r
1 + (1 + r)
, (25)
requires a relatively high traded sector weight in the demand for the di¤erence equation to be
unstable. The second stability condition,
 >
 (1 + r)  (1 + )
 (1 + r)
, (26)
shows that the solution is unstable for a su¢ ciently low interest rate for any given values of
the discount factor of future consumption and weight on traded sector consumption. Hence, a
su¢ ciently low r implies that the development of the levels of interest is diverging. Both of the
conditions in ineq. (25) and in ineq. (26) are enveloped by the constraint given by ineq. (16).
A3 Stability analysis 2
As shown in A2, certain combinations of parameter values imply that the growth path is diverg-
ing. However, the diverging evolution of the productivity level will eventually approach a steady
state growth rate which is sensitive to the parameter values. The steady state fraction of the
labor force employed in the traded sector is easily derived from (1) and (15),
t+1 =
1
1 + 

 +    (1  )

1
(1 + r)
Rt+1
2
+ (1 + )
Rt
2
+ (1 + r)
Rt 1
2

1
Ht

  
1 + 
(1  ) (1 + r) 1
1 + t
(27)
In a growing economy the foreign exchange gift term will approach zero as time approaches
innity, as limt!1 1Ht = 0. Inserting for , the steady state traded sector employment, and
rearranging gives eq. (18)
 =
  [1 +     ( + )]
2 (1 + )
+
q
[1 +     ( + )]2 + 4 (1 + ) [ +     (1  ) (1 + r)]
2 (1 + )
.
Only positive values of employment make economic sense, therefore the negative solution of eq.
(18) is disregarded. The constraint of ineq. (16) ensures a positive steady state growth rate.
The stability of eq. (27) requires that 0 < f 0 (t) < 1, where f (t) = t+1. This condition is
enveloped by ineq. (16). A more intuitive analysis of stability is to employ (27) and analyze
local stability around steady state through the stability condition
0 < f 0 (t) =
 (1  ) (1 + r)
(1 + ) (1 + )
2 =

(1+) (1  ) (1 + r)Ht
(1 + )Ht

(1 + )
=
CoNt+1
Xt+1

(1 + )
< 1:
By denition the expression is strictly positive, except from the special case where  = 0, which
implies no growth and hence no dynamics. By assumption
CoNt+1
Xt+1
 1. One su¢ cient condition
for convergence of the steady state growth rate is thus (1+) < 1, or equivalently  <
1
1  ,
subject to the constraints given by ineq. (25) and ineq. (26). As for the benchmark case it may
be shown that the steady state equilibrium is stable for any value of  2 [0;!).25 However,
subject to ineq. (16) the conditions above will always be fullled.
A4 The specic solution of (17)
The specic solution of eq. (19) (in the case of real roots) can be derived from eq. (23). Inserting
for the initial conditions H0 and H1 gives two independent equations in C1 and C2. Solving for
C1 and C2 gives
C1 =  H0m2  H1
m1  m2 , (28)
C2 =
H0m1  H1
m1  m2 . (29)
Inserting from equations (28) and (29) into eq. (23) provides the specic solution of the di¤erence
equation in productivity (19) in the case of real roots,
Ht =
(H1  H0m2)mt1 + (H0m1  H1)mt2
m1  m2 . (30)
In eq. (30) the productivity level is a function of time only, given the parameter values and the
initial conditions.
Inserting the benchmark parameter values in eq. (30) gives
Ht = 1:40
h
(H1   0:41H0) (1:13)t + (1:13H0  H1) (0:41)t
i
. (31)
This specic solution for the productivity level is diverging, but the growth rate is converging
towards approximately 0:13 in the benchmark case. Moreover, note that the specic solution is
a function of time only, subject to some initial point of departure, H0 and H1.
25See the Appendix, Numerical analysis of the radicand.
A5 Numerical analysis of the radicand
Whether the roots of the characteristic equation of equations (19), (21) and (22), are real,
double real or complex depends on whether the radicand, Ra (; ; ; r) = 14
h
1++(+)
1+
i2
 
(1 )(1+r)
1+ , is positive, equals zero or is negative. Employing the benchmark values  = 1,
r = 2:39,  = 0:30 and  = 0:4 provides a point of departure for the numerical parameter
analysis.26 This vector of parameter values implies a positive radicand and hence real roots in
the characteristic equation. Marginal increases in r and  decrease the value of the radicand,
while an increase in  has the opposite e¤ect. Under the benchmark conditions,   0:30 is
a point of inection; a lower weight on traded goods consumption than this threshold leads to
complex roots. Similarly,   0:44 and r  3:32 are points of inection. As for the e¤ect of the
strength of the learning-by-doing mechanism, , this will in general enhance the e¤ects of the
other parameters, i.e., weaker learning by doing e¤ects lowers the point of inection for , while
it raises the inection points for both  and r. Stronger learning-by-doing e¤ects will conversely
have the opposite e¤ects on the inection points of the parameters.
26The values of r and  represents annual real interest and discount rates of approximately ve percent each.
Chart 1: Productivity for the young in periods 0 to 5
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Chart 2: Welfare for the young in periods 0 to 5
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Note: The simulations are based on the parameter- and initial state values: α=1, γ=0.4, β=0.3, r=2.4, H1=100 and W1=5. The 
parameters β and r reflect annual real interest- and discount rates of 5 percent over a period of 25 years. In all simulations the 
economy starts out in a steady state equilibrium. B, W and I refer to the benchmark case (B), the wealth transfer policy (W) 
and the income transfer policy (I), respectively. 
